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1 Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 1

Measure institutions on majoritarian-consensus line
Definition of democracy
  1 majority
  2 largest majority possible
10 differences, 2 clusters
  Explanation of 2 clusters: federal, 2 shortcomings, solution
No new distinction of 2 types of democracies
Current view of consensus type (3)
Plan per chapter

2 The Westminster Model of Democracy ............................................................... 9

Best-known example
Woodrow Wilson, exported model
3 prototypes
  UK
    1. one-party executive, few exceptions
    2. cabinet > parliament, 2 conditions, cause = two-party system
    3. two-party system, periods, one-dimensional
    4. majoritarian election-system, disproportions, benefits, PR-trend
    5. interest group pluralism, exception, 2 reasons
    6. centralized gov., (4), 2 exceptions
    7. unicameral legisl., deviation, near-unicameralism
    8. constitutional flexibility
    9. no judicial review, 2 exceptions
   10. dependent central bank

3 The Consensus Model of Democracy ............................................................... 31

Majoritarian = undemocratic (Lewis)
2 responses
Homogeneous vs heterogeneous societies
3 prototypes
  Switzerland (S) and Belgium (B)
    1. broad coalition cabinets, magic formula S, B linguistic groups
    2. exc.-legisl. balance, S separation, B give-and-take
3. multiparty system, S, B, plural societies, S, B
4. PR
5. interest group corporatism, liberal corp., 3 elements, S
6. decentralized gov., S, B
7. bicameralism, 2 conditions, S, B weak bicameralism
8. constitutional rigidity, S, B
9. judicial review, deviation S, B
10. independent central bank, S, B

EU (institutions)
1. broad coalition cabinets, commission
2. exc.-legisl. balance, commission, council
3. multiparty system, in parliament, fragmentation
4. PR, parliament, method (2)
5. interest group corporatism, trend to corporatism
6. decentralized gov.
7. bicameralism, 2 criteria, council > parliament
8. constitutional rigidity, 1957, unanimity
9. judicial review, European Court of Justice, creative approach
10. independent central bank, 1998, political deal

4 Thirty-Six Democracies ............................................................ ....... 48

Comparison of democracies
1945 (or +) – 1996
°Definition of democracies
Dahl, Lincoln
Criterion 1: democracy in 1996, Freedom House 49
  4 borderline cases 50
  right to vote not so early, small states 52
Criterion 2\(^1\): stable democracies in 1996 (2 reasons): 20 years, 19 years 53
  Interrupted democracies, democracies excluded, “but”
°Diverse democracies, 3 waves of democratization (Huntington) 55
  First group (1940 democratic) 57
  + diversity
  Degree of societal division (5 shortcomings, 3 comments)
  Socioeconomic development (HDI) 59
  Population sizes 60
  3 variables important 61
Correlations

\(^1\) Criterion 3 is: population size > 250,000 (p.52 bottom line, p.54 title of table)
5 Party Systems – Two-Party and Multiparty patterns ............... 62

Cabinet (ch.6)
Typical, best correlation
Classification of cabinets, definitional problems
\[ \text{party system, } 2^{nd} \text{ best correlation} \]
two-party system, 2 direct benefits, but contradiction
indirect advantage, but

\[ \text{Effective Number of Parties} \]
Solution (Sartori, 3, relevant parties), + rules for counting
But (2)
Solution (Blondel, number + size)
4 categories, but
Solution (Laakso, Taagepera, N, index of fragmentation)

\[ \text{Closely Allied Parties } [2->1] \]
Definition: party, but
4 criteria, +
But
Solution

\[ \text{Factionalized Parties } [1->2] \]
Parties not unitary, as separate parties
Challenge
Solution

\[ \text{The Party Systems of Thirty-Six Democracies} \]
Mean
Range
Trends

\[ \text{The Issue Dimension of Partisan Conflict} \]
How to determine? (4 guidelines)
7 dimensions (H/M)

\begin{enumerate}
\item Socioeconomic
\item Religious
\item Cultural-ethnic
\item Urban-rural
\item Regime support
\item Foreign policy
\item Postmaterialist
\end{enumerate}

\[ \text{Issue Dimensions and Party Systems} \]
Number of issue dimensions
Expected link (2)
Correlation N and I
Formula (3, +)
6 Cabinets: Concentration vs Sharing of Executive Power .......... 90

One-party majority vs broad multiparty (most important, best correlated)
2 differences (number, parliamentary support base)
   Minimal winning cabinets
   Oversized cabinets
   Minority, undersized cabinets
°Coalition Theories
   Confidence from Parliament
   Predictions (easy when 1 majority party)
   1. Minimal winning coalitions
      a. Parties maximize power
      b. Majority party, no majority party
   2. Minimum size coalitions
      a. Full power-maximization theory
      b. One prediction
   3. Smallest-number-of-parties coalitions
      a. “Bargaining proposition”, few parties
   4. Minimal range coalitions
      a. Minimizing number of “spaces“ (=Mwc+)
   5. Minimal connected winning coalitions
      a. adjacent on policy scale + devoid unnecessary partners
      b. neighbors
   6. Policy-variable coalitions
      a. impose policies (legislative) > holding executive
      b. core party = median party, pivotal party
      c. big policy questions and more detailed matters
°Minority and Oversized Cabinets
   Policy-based theories > policy-blind theories
   Problem: predict always Mwc, but
   Explanations
      Time perspective
      Information effect -> incertainty
      +size principle (center position)
      Defend country
      Minority coalitions, institutional features
      Oversized coalitions, institutional features
°Minority Cabinets (where do they fit?)
   Genuine minority cabinets (11%)
   “Majority governments in disguise” (89%)
      +, +, - > consensus model
°Presidential Cabinets
   2 adjustments
Presidents need legislative support only for proposed laws
Presidents are one-person, one-party cabinets

°Unusual Cabinets
Austria: Mwc over 80% -> oversized coalition
US: Token ministers must be ignored
Japan: Mwc with “partial coalition” -> minority cabinets

°Cabinets in Thirty-Six Democracies
Overall degree of majoritarianism
2 groups on the majoritarian side

°Cabinets and Party Systems
Relationship: effective number of parties in Parl. / majoritarianism

°Addendum: Prime Ministerial Power
Power of prime minister in cabinet
Presidential systems
Parliamentary systems (3 +1), King

7 Executive – Legislative Relations:
Dominance vs Balance of Power

Majoritarian model with executive dominance vs consensus model with balance

°Parliamentary and Presidential Forms of Government
3 crucial differences
Responsibility before legislative branch
Presidents are elected
Collective vs one-person executives
8 possible combinations (2 pure + 6 hybrids)
semi-presidential problem + France, Finland, Israel

°Additional Parliamentary- Presidential Contrasts (but irrelevant)
Compatibilities vs incompatibilities
Right to dissolve Parliament
Head of State vs Head of Government

°Separation of Power and Balance of Power
Parliamentary-Presidential is NOT Executive-Legislative relationship
Presidential Powers (3 sources)
Constitutional powers
Partisan support
Popular election
Dependence when based on party support
More stable when based on constitutional powers

°Measuring Degrees of Dominance and Balance of Power
Parliamentary systems: cabinet durability (Dodd)
Cabinet instability is NOT regime instability (+)
2 alternatives to determine start and end of cabinets
Partisan composition as sole criterion
3 or 4 (Acl I, pp.132-133) criteria
8 Electoral Systems – Majority and Purality Methods vs PR... 143

Plurality and majority district methods
Proportional Representation
+ few changes
Electoral Formulas
Refined typology, 7 attributes
1. Electoral formula
   Plurality rule, Majority formulas (3)
   Types of PR (3)
   Semiproportional formulas (2)
   No change of formula, exceptions
2. District Magnitude
   Definition
   Single-member and multimember districts
   2 reasons for importance
   Strong influence on disproportionality (opposite directions)
   Strong impact because varies greatly in PR
   + two levels of districts when PR
3. Electoral Thresholds
   Definition
   2 ways of barrier, formula
Other Electoral System Attributes
4. Size of body to be elected, 2 reasons
   Legislatures with less than 100 representatives
   Nb of Representatives=Cube root of population
5. Presidential Systems
   Effect of effective nb of parliamentary parties
6. Malapportionment
   Definition: single-member and multimember districts
   + possible elimination
   Rural overrepresentation
7. Interparty electoral links
   Definition
   = apparentement, reduces disproportionality

Degrees of Disproportionality
Measurement of overall disproportionality
Summing up

Index of disproportionality (Gallagher) 158

Problem when two sets of votes

Electoral Disproportionality in Presidential Democracies 159

Important election, turnout levels, disproportional

Higher disproportionality 161

Geometric mean

Degrees of Disproportionality in Thirty-Six Democracies 163

Line: PR vs plurality, majority systems, + (p.164)

Electoral Systems and Party Systems 165

Duverger: plurality methods -> two-party system

Mechanical and psychological factors

Rae: links between electoral and party systems, all electoral systems

Disproportionality

Reduction of effective parliamentary parties

Minority of votes -> majority of seats (possible in every system)

+ stronger tendency in plurality, majority than PR 167

+ Rae: manufactured majority, earned majority, natural minority

Statistical link: Electoral Disprop. and Nb of eff. Parl. Parties 168

+ gap between 5 and 8 percent 170

2 groups:

○ most of PR + Japan

○ plurality, majority, impure PR (Greece, Spain), presidential

9 Interest Groups – Pluralism vs Corporatism............................... ....... 171

Typically:

Majoritarian model: competitive, uncoordinated pluralism

Consensus model: coordinated, compromise-oriented corporatism

Corporatism: 2 different meanings (often occur together)

Interest group system with monopolistic peak organizations

(corporatism ('))

Incorporation of interest groups into the process of policy

formation (concertation)

Corporatism (') is: (Schmitter) 172

1. large and few interests groups

2. coordinated into peak organizations

Concertation is:

3. regular consultation

4. comprehensive agreements, tripartite pacts

+ ideology of social partnership (Katzenstein)

Pluralism: 1. Multiplicity of small groups

2. absence or weakness of peak organizations

3. little or no tripartite consultation

4. absence of tripartite pacts

The Decline of Corporatism? 173
Since 70ties: corporatism seems more effective
More recently: corporatism in decline
But, more precisely: efficacy of corporatist structures and frequency is declining,
it’s only a matter of degree,
no overall decline in democracies,
developing onto new areas,
growth of corporatism in small countries,
shift: social -> liberal corporatism
+ corporatism: continuity with periodic demise and resurrection

° Degrees of Pluralism and Corporatism in Thirty-Six Democracies
Measure this degree
Problems (5) 176
Solution: eight basic aspects, five-point scale, 2 periods
Problem: 12 developing countries (2) 178
Solution: judgments by area experts
Description of results 180

° Interest Group Systems, Party Systems, and Cabinet Types 181
No clear connection “type of interest groups” to other 4 variables
Multipluralism -> less pluralist, more corporatist
Outliers, Italy 182
Link with electoral system and executive dominance 183

10 Division of Power – The Federal-Unitary and Centralized-Decentralized Contrasts ....... 185
First of the second set of variables (federal-unitary dimension)
Federalism: most typical and drastic method of dividing power
Typically: Pure majoritarian model: total control 186
Consensus model: federalism and decentralization

° Federalism and Decentralization
Primary characteristics = components, definitions of federalism (5)
Secondary Characteristics = guarantors (3) 187
Fivefold classification: 188
Federal vs Unitary
Centralized vs Decentralized
+ intermediate category (semi-federal)
Description of results 189
Federal 190
Unitary
Semi-federal (Dahl) 191

° Other Indicators of federalism and Decentralization
Measure by total tax receipts 192
Institutional autonomy index (Lane, Ersson) 194
-> validation of results found by Lijphart 195
Federalism and Ethnic Autonomy

Federalism in: Largest countries

Plural societies

Congruent vs incongruent federalism (Tarlton)

Canada, India, Belgium

Federalism and Institutional Experimentation

Units have own constitution, free to modify it

But: in practice

11 Parliaments and Congresses – Concentration vs Division of
Legislative Power............................ 200

Majoritarian model (New Zealand) vs consensus model (Switzerland)
+ 2 (names of chambers, congress)

Unicameralism and Bicameralism

Simple dichotomous classification, but (2)

Lijphart vs Tsebelis/Money

+ unicameral parliaments with smaller countries

Varieties of Bicameralism

Difference between two chambers

3 less important differences (size, terms, election)

-> affect how the two chambers operate

Strong vs Weak Bicameralism

Three important differences

formal powers

method of selection

-> symmetrical vs asymmetrical chambers

2nd chamber: overrepresentation by minorities

Table 11.1: incongruent vs congruent chambers + Gini index

The Cameral Structures of Thirty-Six Democracies

3 distinctions -> 4 main categories

2 sub-categories (intermediate)

Cameral Structure and Degrees of Federalism/Decentralization

Strong relationship, + when the 2 indexes are used

+ outliers, + population size matters

12 Constitutions: Amendment Procedures and Judicial Review. ....... 216

Flexible vs rigid Constitutions

Presence/Absence of Judicial Review

Written and Unwritten Constitutions

Seems unimportant (2)

But (2)

Flexible and Rigid Constitutions
Multiplicity of devices to make constitution rigid, variety
4 basic types, + adjustment
  + Plurality with supermajorites 220
  + Plurality with 2/3 221
Solutions to variety of constitutional amendment (2)
Stability of rules of constitutional amendment
Most countries in middle category, + 5 more rigid 222

Judicial Review 223
Review by: parliament or courts/special tribunal
Denying review power to court, parliament, special court 224
Centralized vs Decentralized system 225
  + France

Judicial Review and Judicial Activism
  Formal existence + vigor/frequency of review
  Fourfold classification (very strong, medium, weak, no)
  + Trend to stronger judicial review (3) 227
  Surprising conclusion 228

Constitutional Rigidity and Judicial Review
  2 reasons to expect correlation
    Outliers 229
    + Federal system 230

Addendum: Referendums and Consensus Democracy
  Frequent use, 2 possibilities (majoritarian vs anti-majoritarian)

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Central banks neglected, but
Economists have indexes (3) 233

The Duties and Powers of Central Banks
  Monetary policy, + (5)
    + Central banks have become more important 234

Measuring the Independence of Central Banks 235
  First index, + 4 countries not included
  Second index 238
  Third index
    Mean 239

Federalism and Central Bank Independence 240
  Some possible correlations:
    With corporatism, but
    With executive dominance, but
    With federalism
14 The Two-Dimensional Conceptual Map of Democracy

° The Two Dimensions
  Correlations: 2 clusters (cluster 1 > cluster 2)
  Factor analysis: 2 clusters

° The Conceptual Map of Democracy
  2 dimensions (cf: 2 clusters)
  The prototypical cases
  + combination of consensus and majoritarian characteristics

° Explanations
  Geographical proximity (4)
  British heritage (3 + correlations)
  Plural societies
  Population size (+ correlations)

° Shifts on the Conceptual Map
  2 periods: 1945-70 and 1971-96
  General picture: no radical transformations
  + countries with greater shifts
  + Netherlands

15 Macro-Economic Management and the Control of Violence:
  Does Consensus Democracy Make a Difference?

Conventional wisdom
  Consensus democracy provides better representation (ch. 16)
  Majoritarian democracy better at policy-making (speed, coherence)

° Hypotheses and Preliminary Evidence
  Lowell’s axiom
  Counterarguments (3)
  Empirical evidence is mixed (5)

Macroeconomic management and violence as indicators (hypothesis)
  + other influences
  -> control variables (3) + long period, excluding small countries

° Consensus Democracy and Successful Macro-Economic Management
  6 groups of variables
  Independent variable: executives-parties dimension
    I. economic growth (3)
    II. annual inflation (5)
    III. unemployment (4)
    IV. strike activity (2)
    V. budget deficits (2)
    VI. economic freedom (3)
  ➔ mixed results, consensus democracy slightly better
Consensus Democracy and the Control of Violence (VII, 4)
The Effects of the Federalist Dimension of Consensus Democracy

Conventional wisdom applies also to federal-unitary dimension
Weak relationships
+ exception: inflation (consensus democracy significantly better)

3 conclusions
Consensus democracies better, but weak correlations, not significant
+ “Majoritarian democracy better at policy-making” is wrong

16 The Quality of Democracy and a “Kinder, Gentler” Democracy:
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Conventional wisdom
Consensus democracy provides better representation

Consensus Democracy and Democratic Quality
8 sets of indicators
Independent variable: executives-parties dimension
I. democratic quality (2, second indicator is better)
II. women’s representation (3) 280
III. political equality (3) 282
IV. electoral participation (2) 284
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VIII. John Stuart Mill’s Hypotheses (2, +3 reasons) 289

Consensus democracies have better records
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Consensus Democracy and Its Kinder, Gentler Qualities
consensus democracies have better records (+ women)
4 sets of indicators
Independent variable: executives-parties dimension
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III. criminal justice systems (2) 297
IV. foreign policy (3) 298

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2 conclusions
    Variety of rules and institutions can be grouped into 2 patterns
    Policy performance: consenus vs majoritarian democracies (2)
1 practical implication: consensus democracy is the better option  302
°The Good News (2)
    No contradiction between effectiveness and representation
    Not difficult to introduce consensus characteristics
    2 conditions: PR and parliamentarism 303
        3 minor, 3 major exceptions
        + no fear of unstable cabinets (2) 304
        + control degree of multipartism (1)
°And the (Seemingly) Bad News (2) 305
    Institutional patterns block change to consensus (geographical congruence)
    Need of political consensus culture 306
        + one underlying consensual culture
°Grounds for Optimism (2) 307
    Culture and structure influence each other
    Even if institutional blocks, consensus culture present (4)

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How to read this summary:
"°°" indicates subtitle in the book
"+" (without anything before) means "additional idea"
"(x)" indicates frequency
Page number indicates beginning of section

All indications are based on a personal reading of the book. Other divisions are possible.

This work has 2 main objectives: summing up the main ideas, and delivering a detailed structure of the book in order to navigate confidently through it when (re)looking for information.

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