

Lijphart, Arend. 1999.
Patterns of Democracy.

New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

<i>Preface</i>	<i>ix</i>
1 Introduction	1
2 The Westminster Model of Democracy	9
3 The Consensus Model of Democracy	31
4 Thirty-Six Democracies	48
5 Party Systems – Two-Party and Multiparty patterns	62
6 Cabinets: Concentration vs Sharing of Executive Power	90
7 Executive – Legislative Relations: Dominance vs Balance of Power	116
8 Electoral Systems – Majority and Plurality Methods vs PR.....	143
9 Interest Groups – Pluralism vs Corporatism.....	171
10 Division of Power – The Federal-Unitary and Centralized-Decentralized Contrasts	185
11 Parliaments and Congresses – Concentration vs Division of Legislative Power.....	200
12 Constitutions: Amendment Procedures and Judicial Review .	216
13 Central Banks: Independence vs Dependence	232
14 The Two-Dimensional Conceptual Map of Democracy.....	243
15 Macro-Economic Management and the Control of Violence: Does Consensus Democracy Make a Difference?....	258
16 The Quality of Democracy and a “Kinder, Gentler” Democracy: Consensus Democracy Makes a Difference	275
17 Conclusions and Recommendations	301
<i>Appendixes A and B</i>	<i>311</i>

<i>Preface</i>	<i>ix</i>
<i>Democracies</i> (1984): 3 major findings	
9 improvements to <i>Democracies</i>	
Thanksgiving	
1 Introduction	1
Measure institutions on majoritarian-consensus line	
Definition of democracy	
1 majority	2
2 largest majority possible	
10 differences, 2 clusters	
Explanation of 2 clusters: federal, 2 shortcomings, solution	3
No new distinction of 2 types of democracies	5
Current view of consensus type (3)	6
Plan per chapter	7
2 The Westminster Model of Democracy	9
Best-known example	
Woodrow Wilson, exported model	
3 prototypes	10
UK	
1. one-party executive, few exceptions	
2. cabinet > parliament, 2 conditions, cause = two-party system	
3. two-party system, periods, one-dimensional	
4. majoritarian election-system, disproportions, benefits, PR-trend	
5. interest group pluralism, exception, 2 reasons	
6. centralized gov., (4), 2 exceptions	
7. unicameral legisl., deviation, near-unicameralism	
8. constitutional flexibility	
9. no judicial review, 2 exceptions	
10. dependent central bank	
3 The Consensus Model of Democracy	31
Majoritarian = undemocratic (Lewis)	
2 responses	
Homogeneous vs heterogeneous societies	32
3 prototypes	34
Switzerland (S) and Belgium (B)	
1. broad coalition cabinets, magic formula S, B linguistic groups	
2. exc.-legisl. balance, S separation, B give-and-take	

3. multiparty system, S, B, plural societies, S, B	
4. PR	
5. interest group corporatism, liberal corp., 3 elements, S	
6. decentralized gov., S, B	
7. bicameralism, 2 conditions, S, B weak bicameralism	
8. constitutional rigidity, S, B	
9. judicial review, deviation S, B	
10. independent central bank, S, B	
EU (institutions)	42
1. broad coalition cabinets, commission	
2. exc.-legisl. balance, commission, council	
3. multiparty system, in parliament, fragmentation	
4. PR, parliament, method (2)	
5. interest group corporatism, trend to corporatism	
6. decentralized gov.	
7. bicameralism, 2 criteria, council > parliament	
8. constitutional rigidity, 1957, unanimity	
9. judicial review, European Court of Justice, creative approach	
10. independent central bank, 1998, political deal	

4 Thirty-Six Democracies 48

Comparison of democracies	
1945 (or +) – 1996	
°Definition of democracies	
Dahl, Lincoln	
Criterion 1: democracy in 1996, Freedom House	49
4 borderline cases	50
right to vote not so early, small states	52
Criterion 2 ¹ : stable democracies in 1996 (2 reasons): 20 years, 19 years	53
Interrupted democracies, democracies excluded, “but”	
°Diverse democracies, 3 waves of democratization (Huntington)	55
First group (1940 democratic)	57
+ diversity	
Degree of societal division (5 shortcomings, 3 comments)	
Socioeconomic development (HDI)	59
Population sizes	60
3 variables important	61
Correlations	

¹ Criterion 3 is : population size > 250.000 (p.52 bottom line, p.54 title of table)

5 Party Systems – Two-Party and Multiparty patterns 62

Cabinet (ch.6)	
Typical, best correlation	
Classification of cabinets, definitional problems	
➔ party system, 2 nd best correlation	63
two-party system, 2 direct benefits, but contradiction	
indirect advantage, but	64
°Effective Number of Parties	65
Solution (Sartori, 3, relevant parties), + rules for counting	
But (2)	66
Solution (Blondel, number + size)	
4 categories, but	67
Solution (Laakso, Taagepera, N, index of fragmentation)	
68	
°Closely Allied Parties [2->1]	69
Definition: party, but	
4 criteria, +	70
But	71
Solution	
°Factionalized Parties [1->2]	72
Parties not unitary, as separate parties	
Challenge	73
Solution	
°The Party Systems of Thirty-Six Democracies	74
Mean	
Range	75
Trends	
°The Issue Dimension of Partisan Conflict	78
How to determine? (4 guidelines)	
7 dimensions (H/M)	79
(1) Socioeconomic	
(2) Religious	82
(3) Cultural-ethnic	83
(4) Urban-rural	84
(5) Regime support	85
(6) Foreign policy	
(7) Postmaterialist	86
°Issue Dimensions and Party Systems	87
Number of issue dimensions	
Expected link (2)	
Correlation N and I	88
Formula (3, +)	89

6 Cabinets: Concentration vs Sharing of Executive Power 90

One-party majority vs broad multiparty (most important, best correlated)	
2 differences (number, parliamentary support base)	
Minimal winning cabinets	
Oversized cabinets	
Minority, undersized cabinets	
°Coalition Theories	91
Confidence from Parliament	
Predictions (easy when 1 majority party)	
1. Minimal winning coalitions	92
a. Parties maximize power	
b. Majority party, no majority party	93
2. Minimum size coalitions	
a. Full power-maximization theory	
b. One prediction	94
3. Smallest-number-of-parties coalitions	
a. “Bargaining proposition”, few parties	
4. Minimal range coalitions	
a. Minimizing number of “spaces“ (=Mwc+)	
5. Minimal connected winning coalitions	95
a. adjacent on policy scale + devoid unnecessary partners	
b. neighbors	
6. Policy-variable coalitions	
a. impose policies (legislative) > holding executive	
b. core party = median party, pivotal party	
c. big policy questions and more detailed matters	96
°Minority and Oversized Cabinets	
Policy-based theories > policy-blind theories	
Problem: predict always Mwc, but	97
Explanations	99
Time perspective	
Information effect -> uncertainty	
+size principle (center position)	
Defend country	100
Minority coalitions, institutional features	
Oversized coalitions, institutional features	102
°Minority Cabinets (where do they fit?)	103
Genuine minority cabinets (11%)	
“Majority governments in disguise” (89%)	
+, +, -> consensus model	
°Presidential Cabinets	
2 adjustments	

Presidents need legislative support only for proposed laws	105
Presidents are one-person, one-party cabinets	
°Unusual Cabinets	106
Austria: Mwc over 80% -> oversized coalition	
US: Token ministers must be ignored	107
Japan: Mwc with “partial coalition” -> minority cabinets	108
°Cabinets in Thirty-Six Democracies	109
Overall degree of majoritarianism	
2 groups on the majoritarian side	110
°Cabinets and Party Systems	112
Relationship: effective number of parties in Parl. / majoritarianism	
°Addendum: Prime Ministerial Power	113
Power of prime minister in cabinet	
Presidential systems	
Parliamentary systems (3 +1), King	114

7 Executive – Legislative Relations:

Dominance vs Balance of Power 116

Majoritarian model with executive dominance vs consensus model with balance

°Parliamentary and Presidential Forms of Government	117
3 crucial differences	
Responsibility before legislative branch	
Presidents are elected	
Collective vs one-person executives	118
8 possible combinations (2 pure + 6 hybrids)	
semi-presidential problem + France, Finland, Israel	121
°Additional Parliamentary-Presidential Contrasts (but irrelevant)	124
Compatibilities vs incompatibilities	125
Right to dissolve Parliament	
Head of State vs Head of Government	126
°Separation of Power and Balance of Power	127
Parliamentary-Presidential is NOT Executive-Legislative relationship	
Presidential Powers (3 sources)	
Constitutional powers	
Partisan support	128
Popular election	
Dependence when based on party support	
More stable when based on constitutional powers	
°Measuring Degrees of Dominance and Balance of Power	129
Parliamentary systems: cabinet durability (Dodd)	
Cabinet instability is NOT regime instability (+)	
2 alternatives to determine start and end of cabinets	131
Partisan composition as sole criterion	
3 or 4 (Acl I, pp.132-133) criteria	

Index of executive dominance, 2 adjustments	133
°Executive-Legislative Relations in Thirty-Six Democracies	134
°Cabinet Types and Cabinet Durability	135
3 reasons to expect a link, table	
+ minority cabinets (2)	137
Relationship and outliers	138
°Addendum: Monarchs and Presidents	139

8 Electoral Systems – Majority and Purity Methods vs PR..... 143

Plurality and majority district methods	
Proportional Representation	
+ few changes	
°Electoral Formulas	144
Refined typology, 7 attributes	
1. Electoral formula	146
Plurality rule, Majority formulas (3)	
Types of PR (3)	147
Semiproportional formulas (2)	149
No change of formula, exceptions	
2. °District Magnitude	150
Definition	
Single-member and multimember districts	
2 reasons for importance	
Strong influence on disproportionality (opposite directions)	
Strong impact because varies greatly in PR	152
+ two levels of districts when PR	
3. °Electoral Thresholds	153
Definition	
2 ways of barrier, formula	
°Other Electoral System Attributes	154
4. Size of body to be elected, 2 reasons	
Legislatures with less than 100 representatives	
Nb of Representatives=Cube root of population	
5. Presidential Systems	155
Effect of effective nb of parliamentary parties	
6. Malapportionment	156
Definition: single-member and multimember districts	
+ possible elimination	
Rural overrepresentation	
7. Interparty electoral links	157
Definition	
= <i>apparentement</i> , reduces disproportionality	
°Degrees of Disproportionality	
Measurement of overall disproportionality	

Summing up	
Index of disproportionality (Gallagher)	158
Problem when two sets of votes	
°Electoral Disproportionality in Presidential Democracies	159
Important election, turnout levels, disproportional	
Higher disproportionality	161
Geometric mean	
°Degrees of Disproportionality in Thirty-Six Democracies	163
Line: PR vs plurality, majority systems, + (p.164)	
°Electoral Systems and Party Systems	165
Duverger: plurality methods -> two-party system	
Mechanical and psychological factors	
Rae: links between electoral and party systems, all electoral systems	
Disproportionality	
Reduction of effective parliamentary parties	
Minority of votes -> majority of seats (possible in every system)	
+ stronger tendency in plurality, majority than PR	167
+ Rae: manufactured majority, earned majority, natural minority	
Statistical link: Electoral Disprop. and Nb of eff. Parl. Parties	168
+ gap between 5 and 8 percent	170
➔ 2 groups:	
○ most of PR + Japan	
○ plurality, majority, impure PR (Greece, Spain), presidential	

9 Interest Groups – Pluralism vs Corporatism 171

Typically:	Majoritarian model: competitive, uncoordinated pluralism	
	Consensus model: coordinated, compromise-oriented corporatism	
Corporatism:	2 different meanings (often occur together)	
	Interest group system with monopolistic peak organizations (corporatism (‘))	
	Incorporation of interest groups into the process of policy formation (concertation)	
	Corporatism (‘) is: (Schmitter)	172
	1. large and few interest groups	
	2. coordinated into peak organizations	
	Concertation is :	
	3. regular consultation	
	4. comprehensive agreements, tripartite pacts	
	+ ideology of social partnership (Katzenstein)	
Pluralism:	1. Multiplicity of small groups	
	2. absence or weakness of peak organizations	
	3. little or no tripartite consultation	
	4. absence of tripartite pacts	
°The Decline of Corporatism?		173

Since 70ties: corporatism seems more effective	
More recently: corporatism in decline	
But, more precisely: efficacy of corporatist structures and frequency is declining,	
it's only a matter of gedree,	
no overall decline in democracies,	174
developing onto new areas,	
growth of corporatism in small countries,	
shift: social -> liberal corporatism	175
+corporatism: continuity with periodic demise and resurrection	
°Degrees of Pluralism and Corporatism in Thirty-Six Democracies	
Measure this degree	
Problems (5)	176
Solution: eight basic aspects, five-point scale, 2 periods	
Problem: 12 developing countries (2)	178
Solution: judgments by area experts	
Description of results	180
°Interest Group Systems, Party Systems, and Cabinet Types	181
No clear connection "type of interest groups" to other 4 variables	
Multipluralism -> less pluralist, more corporatist	
Outliers, Italy	182
Link with electoral system and executive dominance	183

10 Division of Power – The Federal-Unitary and Centralized-Decentralized Contrasts 185

First of the second set of variables (federal-unitary dimension)	
Federalism: most typical and drastic method of dividing power	
Typically: Pure majoritarian model: total control	186
Consensus model: federalism and decentralization	
°Federalism and Decentralization	
Primary characteristics = components, definitions of federalism (5)	
Secondary Characteristics = guarantators (3)	187
Fivefold classification:	188
Federal vs Unitary	
Centralized vs Decentralized	
+ intermediate category (semi-federal)	
Description of results	189
Federal	190
Unitary	
Semi-federal (Dahl)	191
°Other Indicators of federalism and Decentralization	
Measure by total tax receipts	192
Institutional autonomy index (Lane, Ersson)	194
-> validation of results found by Lijphart	195

°Federalism and Ethnic Autonomy	
Federalism in: Largest countries	
Plural societies	
Congruent vs incongruent federalism (Tarlton)	
Canada, India, Belgium	196
°Federalism and Institutional Experimentation	197
Units have own constitution, free to modify it	
But: in practice	
11 Parliaments and Congresses – Concentration vs Division of Legislative Power.....	200
Majoritarian model (New Zealand) vs consensus model (Switzerland)	
+ 2 (names of chambers, congress)	201
°Unicameralism and Bicameralism	
Simple dichotomous classification, but (2)	
Lijphart vs Tsebelis/Money	202
+ unicameral parliaments with smaller countries	
°Varieties of Bicameralism	203
Difference between two chambers	
3 less important differences (size, terms, election)	204
-> affect how the two chambers operate	205
°Strong vs Weak Bicameralism	
Three important differences	
formal powers	
method of selection	206
-> symmetrical vs asymmetrical chambers	
2 nd chamber: overrepresentation by minorities	207
Table 11.1 : incongruent vs congruent chambers + Gini index	208
°The Cameral Structures of Thirty-Six Democracies	211
3 distinctions -> 4 main categories	
2 sub-categories (intermediate)	213
°Cameral Structure and Degrees of Federalism/Decentralization	
Strong relationship, + when the 2 indexes are used	
+ outliers, + population size matters	214
12 Constitutions: Amendment Procedures and Judicial Review	216
Flexible vs rigid Constitutions	
Presence/Absence of Judicial Review	
°Written and Unwritten Constitutions	217
Seems unimportant (2)	
But (2)	218
Flexible and Rigid Constitutions	

Multiplicity of devices to make constitution rigid, variety	
4 basic types, + adjustment	219
+ Plurality with supermajorities	220
+ Plurality with 2/3	221
Solutions to variety of constitutional amendment (2)	
Stability of rules of constitutional amendment	
Most countries in middle category, + 5 more rigid	222
Judicial Review	223
Review by: parliament or courts/special tribunal	
Denying review power to court, parliament, special court	224
Centralized vs Decentralized system	225
+ France	
°Judicial Review and Judicial Activism	
Formal existence + vigor/frequency of review	
Fourfold classification (very strong, medium, weak, no)	
+ Trend to stronger judicial review (3)	227
Surprising conclusion	228
°Constitutional Rigidity and Judicial Review	
2 reasons to expect correlation	
Outliers	229
+ Federal system	230
°Addendum: Referendums and Consensus Democracy	
Frequent use, 2 possibilities (majoritarian vs anti-majoritarian)	
13 Central Banks: Independence vs Dependence	232
Central banks neglected, but	
Economists have indexes (3)	233
°The Duties and Powers of Central Banks	
Monetary policy, + (5)	
+ Central banks have become more important	234
°Measuring the Independence of Central Banks	235
First index, + 4 countries not included	
Second index	238
Third index	
Mean	239
°Federalism and Central Bank Independence	240
Some possible correlations:	
With corporatism, but	
With executive dominance, but	
With federalism	

14 The Two-Dimensional Conceptual Map of Democracy 243

- °The Two Dimensions
 - Correlations: 2 clusters (cluster 1 > cluster 2)
 - Factor analysis: 2 clusters 245
- °The Conceptual Map of Democracy 246
 - 2 dimensions (cf: 2 clusters)
 - The prototypical cases 247
 - + combination of consensus and majoritarian characteristics 249
- °Explanations 250
 - Geographical proximity (4)
 - British heritage (3 + correlations)
 - Plural societies 252
 - Population size (+ correlations)
- °Shifts on the Conceptual Map 253
 - 2 periods: 1945-70 and 1971-96
 - General picture: no radical transformations 254
 - + countries with greater shifts
 - + Netherlands 256

15 Macro-Economic Management and the Control of Violence:
Does Consensus Democracy Make a Difference? 258

- Conventional wisdom
 - Consensus democracy provides better representation (ch. 16)
 - Majoritarian democracy better at policy-making (speed, coherence)
- °Hypotheses and Preliminary Evidence 259
 - Lowell's axiom
 - Counterarguments (3)
 - Empirical evidence is mixed (5) 260
- Macroeconomic management and violence as indicators (hypothesis) 261
 - + other influences
 - > control variables (3) + long period, excluding small countries 262
- °Consensus Democracy and Successful Macro-Economic Management 263
 - 6 groups of variables
 - Independent variable: executives-parties dimension
 - I. economic growth (3) 264
 - II. annual inflation (5) 265
 - III. unemployment (4) 268
 - IV. strike activity (2) 269
 - V. budget deficits (2)
 - VI. economic freedom (3) 270
 - ➔ mixed results, consensus democracy slightly better

°Consensus Democracy and the Control of Violence (VII, 4)	
°The Effects of the Federalist Dimension of Consensus Democracy	272
Conventional wisdom applies also to federal-unitary dimension	
Weak relationships	
+ exception: inflation (consensus democracy significantly better)	
3 conclusions	273
Consensus democracies better, but weak correlations, not significant	274
+ “Majoritarian democracy better at policy-making” is wrong	
16 The Quality of Democracy and a “Kinder, Gentler” Democracy: Consensus Democracy Makes a Difference	275
Conventional wisdom	
Consensus democracy provides better representation	
°Consensus Democracy and Democratic Quality	276
8 sets of indicators	
Independent variable: executives-parties dimension	
I. democratic quality (2, second indicator is better)	
II. °women’s representation (3)	280
III. °political equality (3)	282
IV. °electoral participation (2)	284
V. °satisfaction with democracy (2)	286
VI. °Government-Voter Proximity (2)	287
VII. °Accountability and Corruption (1)	288
VIII. °John Stuart Mill’s Hypotheses (2, +3 reasons)	289
➔ consensus democracies have better records	292
Independent variable: federal-unitary dimension (weak correlations)	293
°Consensus Democracy and Its Kinder, Gentler Qualities	
consensus democracies have better records (+ women)	
4 sets of indicators	294
Independent variable: executives-parties dimension	
I. Democracies as welfare states (3)	
II. environmental performance (2)	295
III. criminal justice systems (2)	297
IV. foreign policy (3)	298
Independent variable: federal-unitary dimension (weak correlations)	299
Conclusion: impressive correlations	300

17 Conclusions and Recommendations 301

2 conclusions

Variety of rules and institutions can be grouped into 2 patterns
Policy performance: consensus vs majoritarian democracies (2)
1 practical implication: consensus democracy is the better option 302

°The Good News (2)
No contradiction between effectiveness and representation
Not difficult to introduce consensus characteristics
2 conditions: PR and parliamentarism 303
 3 minor, 3 major exceptions
 + no fear of unstable cabinets (2) 304
 + control degree of multipartism (1)

°And the (Seemingly) Bad News (2) 305
Institutional patterns block change to consensus (geographical congruence)
Need of political consensus culture 306
+ one underlying consensual culture

°Grounds for Optimism (2) 307
Culture and structure influence each other
Even if institutional blocks, consensus culture present (4)

Appendixes A and B..... 311

How to read this summary:

- “°” indicates subtitle in the book
- “+” (without anything before) means “additional idea”
- “(x)” indicates frequency
- Page number indicates beginning of section

All indications are based on a personal reading of the book. Other divisions are possible.

This work has 2 main objectives: summing up the main ideas, and delivering a detailed structure of the book in order to navigate confidently through it when (re)looking for information.

BY: *BEN JACOBY*²

² benjacoby@gmx.net (only use for appropriate needs!)